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NOTES AND COMMENTS
INSURANCE
AUTOMOBILE INDEMNITY - STATUS OF THE INSURED DE-
FENDANT
The plaintiffs, as executors of the decedent, had recovered a judg-
ment against the insured for injuries, resulting in the death of the
decedent. The injuries were alleged to have been caused by the negli-
gence of the insured, in the operation of his automobile in which the
decedent was a passenger. The judgment was not paid and the plaintiffs
brought an action against the defendant, Ohio Casualty Insurance Co.,
the insurer of the automobile owned and driven by the insured when the
accident occurred. The defendant pleaded as a defense the breach of
a clause in the insurance policy, requiring the insured to cooperate with
the insurer in preparing a defense to an action by the injured party. The
plaintiffs recovered a judgment for the full amount in the Common
Pleas Court. The Court of Appeals, upon appeal, reversed the trial
court on the ground that the finding that there was not a lack of
co-operation on the part of the insured was manifestly against the weight
of the evidence. Upon a motion to certify, the Supreme Court took the
case and affirmed the Court of Appeals entering final judgment for the
defendant. Luntz v. Stern, 135 Ohio St. 225, 2o N.E. (2d) 241,
14 Ohio 0. 62 (1939).
The plaintiffs brought their action by a supplemental petition, basing
their rights on Sections 95 10-3 and 9510-4 of the Ohio General Code,
which gives the injured party a direct action against the insurer to
recover the insurance money. A condition to bringing the action is a
judgment against the insured. Steinbach v. Maryland Casualty Go., 15
Ohio App. 392 (1921); Canen v. Kraft, et al. , 41 Ohio App. 120,
i8o N.E. 277 (93). Prior to the enactment of this statute, most
policies of automobile insurance contained a provision that the insurer
should be liable only in cases where the insured had actually paid a judg-
ment obtained against him. The usual interpretation was that such a
policy was one of indemnity against loss, not against liability, and pay-
ment of a judgment by the insured was a condition precedent to recovery
from the insurer. Any provision like this in a policy at the present time
would be under the statute. Stacey v. The Fidelity and Casualty
Co. of N. Y., et al., I 4 Ohio St. 633, 151 N.E. 718, 21 Ohio App.
70, 152 N.E. 794 (1926); Lorando v Gethro, 228 Mass. 181, 17i
N.E. 185, 1 A.L.R. 1374 (1917); Verducd v. Casualty Go. of
dmnerica, 96 Ohio St. 260, I17 N.E. 235 (1917). The liability of the
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insurer is, however, no greater than the liability to the insured. The
insurer has any defense that ordinarily would be available to it in an
action by the insured on the policy. Royal Indemnity Co. v. Watson,
61 Fed. (2d) 614 (Alabama, 1932); Storer v. Ocean Accident and
Guarantee Corp., 8o Fed. (2d) 470 (Ohio, 1935). The defense fre-
quently relied upon by the insurer to defeat the injured party's action
is a breach of the co-operation clause by the insured. Since the liability
of the insurer is conditional upon this co-operation, the question of
whether there has been a breach of the condition is vital. An immaterial
breach of this condition, causing no prejudice to the insurer, will not
operate to defeat the insured's rights under the contract. George v.
Employer's Liability Ass. Corp., Ltd., 219 Ala. 307, 122 So. 175, 72
A.L.R. 1438 (1929); Conroy v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 292
Pa. 219, 40 Ad. 905 (1928); 72 A.L.R. 1455. However, the
failure to perform an act specifically required, or a wilful non-compli-
ance with the terms of the co-operation clause is a material breach, and
the fact that the insurer is not prejudiced thereby is immaterial. As in
the principal case the insured wilfully refused to sign an answer prepared
by the insurer. Coleman v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 247 N. Y.
271, 16o N.E. 367, 72 A.L.R. 1443 (1928). Upon the occurrence
of an accident the insured is required by an express provision in most
policies, to send immediate notice thereof to the insurer. The State Auto
Mutual Ins. Assn. v. Friedman, 34 Ohio App. 55 I , i7I N.E. 419
(1929); Decker v. Kolleda, 57 Ohio App. 442, 14 N.E. (2d) 417,
26 Ohio L. Abs. 313, I Ohio 0. 124 (1937); United States Cas-
ualty Co. v. Breese, 21 Ohio App. 521, 153 N.E. 2o6, 3 Ohio L.
Abs. 183 (1925). As to what constitutes immediate notice will depend
upon the circumstances. The Travellers Ins. Co. v. Meyers and Co.,
62 Ohio St. 529, 539, 57 N.E. 458 (9oo); Purefoy v. Pacific Auto
Indemnity Exchange, 91 Cal. 91, 53 Pac. (2d) 155 (I935), noted in
24 Cal. Law Rev. 476 (1936). The courts are usually strict in con-
struing this provision because it is essential that the insurer know about
the accident in time to prepare a defense to any suit that may be brought.
Most courts would agree that failure to give notice until after judgment
has been entered in favor of the injured party would be a material
breach. Insured is then under a duty to make a fair and frank disclosure
of information demanded by the company to enable it to determine
whether there is a genuine defense. Insured is not required to join in
the presentation of a sham defense, but is required to act with the utmost
honesty and good faith. Aiding and abetting the plaintiff in bringing
an action was held to be evidence of bad faith in the principal case.
Coleman v. New Amsterdam Casualty Ins. Co., 247 N. Y. 271, i6o
N.E. 367, 72 A.L.R. 1443 (1928); Rohlf v. The Great dmerican
Mutual Indemnity Co., 27 Ohio App. 208, I61 N.E. 232, 25 Ohio
Law Rep. 638 (1927). A failure to forward pleadings immediately, in
violation of a condition in the policy, is of the essence and a delay of five
months has been held a breach voiding the policy. Heller v. Stand-
ard dccident Ins. Co., 27 Ohio App. 405, 5 Ohio L. Abs. 354
(1927). The insured may also be required to give the names of wit-
nesses and secure any available evidence which will assist in making a
legitimate defense to the action against him. The insured flatly refused
to do this in the principal case even though the insurer often requested
him to do so. The intentional falsification of any of these matters vital
to the defense is a violation of the co-operation clause. However, slight
variations have been deemed immaterial. Riggs v. New Jersey Fidelity
and Plate Glass Co., 126 Or. 404, 270 Pac. 479 (1928). A false
statement as to who was driving the car at the time of the accident has
been held enough to show lack of co-operation as a matter of law. .4da
D. Rochon v. The Preferred Accident Ins. Co., of N. Y., 114 Conn.
313, 158 At. 8 5 (1932); Storer v. Ocean Zccident and Guarantee
Corp., Ltd., et al., So Fed. (2d) 470 (Ohio, 1935). Whether or not
the insured's failure to attend the trial of an action against him is lack
of co-operation will depend upon several factors. The insured must
attend the trial if requested to do so by the insurer. Moses v. Ferrel
Indemnity Co. of America, 97 Pa. Super. Ct. 13 (1929). If he has
left the jurisdiction before the trial, his good or bad faith will determine
how far he will be excused from attending. If the insured is absent in
good faith, the insurer must pay the traveling expenses necessary for him
to attend. And a failure to do so will excuse the breach. The Medical
Protective Co. v. Light, Ydmr., 48 Ohio App. 5o8, 149 N.E. 446,
i Ohio 0. 67 (934); American Casualty Co. v. Tiberio, 17 Ohio
L. Abs. 41o (934). There is a positive duty on the insured to keep
the insurer notified as to his whereabouts and a failure to notify the
insurer of a change in address is a breach even if done in good faith.
Rohlf v. The Great American Mutual Indemnity Co., supra. It is not
enough for the insured merely to appear at the trial, but he must testify
if the insurer requests him to do so. Henry C. Francis v. London Guar-
antee and Accident Co., 100 Vt. 425, 138 Ad. 78o (1927). The
giving of truthful testimony is all that is required. A confession of negli-
gence if given truthfully does not constitute a violation of the co-opera-
tion clause. Aime Guerin v. The Indemnity Ins. Go. of North America,
107 Conn. 649, 142 Atl. 268 (1928); 72 A.L.R. 1466. A false
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statement made at the trial of the insured cannot be corrected by a true
statement at the trial of the insurer and if the insurer is prejudiced it
will be a material breach. Storer v. Ocean Accident and Guarantee
Corp., supra. In the principal case the insured, at the first trial, testified
that he was driving on the wrong side of the road. At the second trial
he testified that he was driving on the right side of the road. But a self
contradiction may not constitute lack of co-operation. A failure to
co-operate is not shown by the fact that the insured gave different testi-
mony at the trial from statements he signed at the request of the attorney
for the insurer, which falsely narrated the circumstances favorable to the
insurer. Yorkshire Indemnity Co. v. Rohrkemper, 20 Ohio L. Abs.
II (1935).
While any material breach of the co-operation clause will, if proved,
release the insurer, the hardship resulting to the insured is somewhat
mitigated by a liberal use of the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. If,
before or during the trial of the injured party against the insured, the
insurer discovers any facts amounting to a breach of the co-operation
clause, it waives the defense by assuming or continuing the defense of
the insured. Martin Clarke v. Alexander Enders, et al., 43 Ohio App.
253, 28 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 596 (1931). The insurer may, however,
with the consent of the insured reserve litigation of the question of
non-co-operation until later.
It is truly a hardship for an insured defendant to lose the protection
of his insurance by the lack of co-operation on his part. But the extent
of the hardship can best be seen by an examination of the factors which
may have contributed to the recovery of a judgment against the insured.
The overwhelming majority of the courts have held that it is the right
of the counsel for the plaintiff, in a personal injury case, to examine
prospective jurors upon their voir dire as to their interest in or connection
with a liability insurance company. 56 A.L.R. 1456 (1928); 74
A.L.R. 86o (1931); 95 A.L.R. 404 (935). The Ohio Supreme
Court held in accord with this view in the case of Dowd-Feder v.
Truesdell, 130 Ohio St. 530, 2oo N.E. 762, 5 Ohio 0. 179 (1936),
noted in 2 O.S.L.J. 318. The right to ask these questions on the voir
dire is supported on the ground that the plaintiff is entitled to an unbiased
jury. While this may be a meritorious contention it cannot be denied
that a jury is more likely to render a verdict against an insured defendant
than one who is not insured. "Experience has shown that parties insured
for $5,ooo frequently are subjected to verdicts for $Io,ooo, $I5,ooo
or more." Chief Justice Marshall, dissent in Pavilonis v. Valentine, 120
Ohio St. 154, 171, 165 N.E. 730, 27 Ohio App. 26 (1929). How-
420
ever strict the courts are in requiring good faith in asking these questions
the defendant is bound to feel the full force of the resultant implications.
Another well settled principle may become a factor when the insured
defendant is a joint tortfeasor and is sued alone because the injured party
knows that he has insurance. There is a general rule of the common
law that no right of contribution exists between persons whose concur-
rent negligence has made them liable in damages. Royal Indemnity Co.
v. Becker, et al., 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N.E. 194, 34 Ohio App. 544,
30 Ohio Law Rep. 647, 75 A.L.R. 1481 (1930); U. S. Casualty Co.
v. The Indemnity Ins. Co. of North Amer., 129 Ohio St. 391, 195
N.E. 850, 2 Ohio 0. 392 (I935); J. W. Doles, Admr. of Frank
Brown v. Seaboard Airline Ry. Co., i6o N.C. 318, 75 S.E. 722, 42
L.R.A. (N.S.) 67 (1912). There is a growing tendency to distribute
more justly the loss in negligence cases by legislation. GREGORY, LEGIS-
LATIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS, p. 20 (1936).
However, until the states see fit to adopt such laws, the insured joint
tortfeasor, who is sued alone and breaches the co-operation clause, will
have to bear the whole loss.
A further factor is present when the injured party is a guest of the
insured and bases his right to recover on the guest statute. Under Ohio's
Guest Statute, G.C. sec. 6308-6, the guest can only recover for wilful
and wanton misconduct on the part of the owner or operator. In con-
nection with the guest statute see, Effect of the Passenger-for-Hire
Clause on Scope of Protection Under Automobile Insurance Policies,
Comment 0939) 37 Michigan Law Rev. 92o. As most policies of
liability insurance only cover injuries accidentally sustained, the inter-
pretation of wilful and wanton misconduct becomes important. In the
case of Herrell v. Hickok, 133 Ohio St. 66, Ii N.E. (2d) 869 (i937),
noted in 5 O.S. L.J. I Io, the trial court held that injuries caused by
the wilful and wanton misconduct of the insured were not accidentally
sustained as required by the policy. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court and held that such injuries were accidentally
sustained. Herrell v. Hickok, 57 Ohio App. 213, 13 N.E. (2d) 358
(1937). The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals but did
not decide whether wilful and wanton misconduct could result in acci-
dental injuries. In the similar case of Zmerican Casualty Co. v. Brinsky
et al., 51 Ohio App. 298, 5 Ohio 0. 146, 200 N.E. 654 (i934), the
Court of Appeals held contra to the decision of the Herrell case, supra.
It is easy to see the precarious position of the insured defendant in such
a situation. As previously pointed out, the known presence of an insur-
ance company will make it more likely that the injured guest will recover
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a judgment, which may be greater than the amount of the insurance
carried. Until the Supreme Court in the case of Rothmarn v. Metro-
politanlns. Co., 134 Ohio St. 241, 12 Ohio 0. 50, 16 N.E. (2d) 417,
117 A.L.R. 1169 (1938), settled the question and held that wanton
misconduct could result in accidental injuries, the insured defendant was
in danger of losing his insurance because of wanton misconduct, and
therefore be liable for the full amount of the judgment recovered against
him.
From the foregoing considerations it may be concluded that the
insured cannot be too diligent in fulfilling conditions vital to his recovery
on the policy. Too often, as in the principal case, the insured believes
that payment of premiums is all that is required of him.
THOMAS W. APPLEGATE
SALES
THE "FLOOR PLAN RULE" IN OHIO
Plaintiff brought action for conversion of an automobile, claiming
title by virtue of a chattel mortgage executed to it by a retail dealer.
Defendant, another retail dealer, claiming that he had purchased the
car from the retail dealer who had previously executed the mortgage in
question to the plaintiff, contended that the so-called Floor Plan Rule
operated to protect his purchase, which was made subsequent to the
execution of the mortgage in question. The mortgage had been properly
recorded but the defendant had purchased in good faith with no actual
knowledge of the encumbrance. The trial court, upon submission of the
issue, found for the defendant. Upon appeal, the finding was reversed
and judgment was entered for the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals holding
that the rule does not operate to protect a retail dealer against a chattel
mortgagee when the purchase is made from another retail dealer at
wholesale. The Colonial Finance Co. v. Mcrate, 6o Ohio App. 68, 19
N.E. (2d) 527, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 673, 13 Ohio 0. 307 (1938).
At the common law, the generally pronounced rule of chattel prop-
erty was that a seller could convey no greater title than he himself
possessed even to a bona fide purchaser without notice of the defect in
the seller's title.1 The rigors of the application of the rule engendered
a number of exceptions. Thus, in England, it was early held that no
such claim could be countenanced against the buyer at sale in the market
12 Kent's Com. z6z2; Roland v. Gandy, S Ohio, 202 (1831); Sanders v. Keber et al.,
28 Ohio St. 630 (1876).
